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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellee Utah Department of Transportation (referred to herein as "UDOT"), 
opposes this appeal by conflating and confusing the two rulings entered by the district 
court in connection with UDOT's motion in limine. The district court's initial reaction to 
UDOT's motion in limine, as set forth in its October 18, 2007 ruling ("October Ruling"), 
was to construe it as an untimely motion to amend pleadings. October Ruling, Record on 
Appeal ("R.") at pp. 393 & 394. Given the October Ruling, the district court's analysis 
should have ended there, regardless of whether UDOT's underlying substantive argument 
about prior deeds had merit. However, after determining it was too late for UDOT to raise 
the new issue, the district court's October Ruling inexplicably went on to delve into 
further analysis regarding the prior deeds and whether evidence could be admitted about 
the foreseeability of the subject construct project at the time Arby's predecessors executed 
deeds. 
Arby's moved the district court to revise its October Ruling by simply ending its 
analysis at the point it determined UDOT's motion to amend was untimely. Memo. Opp. 
to UDOT's Request to Alter & Amend and in Supp. Cross Mot. to Revise Ruling, R. at pp. 
432-38. If the district court considered it too late for UDOT to raise new arguments, there 
was no reason for the court to go into any further inquiry. 
When the district court entered its February 5, 2008 ruling ("February Ruling") on 
1 
the parties' cross-motions to revise and alter the October Ruling, it agreed with Arby's that 
with respect to the issue of the timeliness of UDOT's attempt to raise new theories, it 
should have previously ended its analysis by finding it was too late for UDOT to amend its 
pleadings to assert the prior deeds issue. February Ruling, R. at p. 468. 
While the district court maintained its position that UDOT's motion in limine was 
an untimely motion to amend, its revised decision boiled down to its interpretation of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-11(2)/ a statute UDOT failed to raise until it filed its motion to 
amend the October Ruling. According to the district court, UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-
11(2) gave UDOT the power to unilaterally amend its taking at anytime. February Ruling, 
R. at p. 470. By allowing UDOT to use UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-11(2) to exclude 
appurtenant rights from the taking, the district court determined Arby's no longer has a 
basis to seek severance damages. Arby's submits the district court's application of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-34-11(2) is in error and should be reversed. Moreover, the ruling below 
should be reversed because it is a product of the district court's failure to follow this 
Court's mandate upon remand following the prior appeal. 
Finally, due to UDOT's conduct, this case presents a type of exceptional 
circumstances justifying this Court's consideration of Arby's request that the valuation 
1
 Since this matter was appealed, this statute has been recodified as UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78B-6-512(2). 
2 
date be adjusted, even if the issue was not raised in the court below. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING BELOW WAS NOT BASED 
UPON THE PURPORTED IMPACT OF PRIOR DEEDS 
UDOT's Brief relies heavily upon the district court's October Ruling, which was 
subsequently revised by the February Ruling. UDOT argues the district court ruled the 
alleged prior deeds that were the basis of its motion in limine preclude Arby's from 
pursuing severance damages. Moreover, UDOT claims that because Arby's has not 
contested the trial court's alleged ruling concerning the deeds on appeal, the matter has 
now been foreclosed. 
UDOT's argument is incorrect and reflects its confusion over the district court's 
October and February Rulings. Regardless of whether there was any merit to UDOT's 
argument that the prior deeds had foreclosed Arby's severance damages claim, the district 
court ruled it was too late for UDOT to raise the claim and denied UDOT's motion in 
Because UDOT has chosen to argue about the prior deeds in its Brief, the two cases it 
cites: State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1993) and Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of 
Utah, 31 P.3d 543 (Utah 2001) are inapplicable to prevent Arby's from responding to 
UDOT's argument. See also Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 611 P.2d 392, 395 (Utah 
1980) (the appellate court has discretion to decide a case upon any point that its proper 
disposition may require, even if first raised in a reply brief.). 
3 
limine.3 October Ruling, R. at pp. 394, 396 & 399. With that determination, the analysis 
should have ended. Unfortunately, the district court went on to consider other issues that 
had become moot as a result of its ruling UDOT was too late in raising new issues. The 
district court's perplexing October Ruling prompted both sides to file motions to revise or 
amend the ruling. 
In its February Ruling, entered after both sides filed their respective motions to 
revise, alter or amend the October ruling, the district court agreed with Arby's that in 
retrospect, its analysis should have ended with its determination that UDOT's motion in 
limine constituted an untimely motion to amend. February Ruling, R. at p. 468. The court 
held: 
It is clear that UDOT does not agree with the Court's initial 
ruling on the issue, but UDOT has provided no additional 
analysis to show that its motion in limine was not acting as a 
motion to amend, and the Court declines to amend its initial 
ruling based on the argument that the motion in limine was 
not acting as a motion to amend. 
Id. at p. 466. (Emphasis added). 
The district court went on to add that "[o]nce the Court ruled that the motion in 
limine was in reality acting as a motion to amend, the issue was properly disposed of, and 
the Court should not have engaged in the foreseeability analysis." Id, at p. 468. In short, 
UDOT attempted to camouflage what was clearly a motion to amend pleadings by 
4 
the district court's position was that regardless of the merits of UDOT's arguments based 
upon the prior deeds, the analysis should have ended upon determining it was too late for 
UDOT to assert new arguments. 
The district court's February Ruling was based upon its interpretation of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-34-11(2). It is important to observe that consistent with its practice in 
this case of holding back arguments, UDOT never mentioned UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-
11(2) in connection with its motion in limine. Instead, the statute was only mentioned 
briefly when UDOT filed its motion to alter or amend the district court's October Ruling. 
Despite the district court sticking to its prior decision regarding the untimeliness of 
UDOT's proposed amendment, its February Ruling held that under the statute, the 
legislature had given UDOT the unilateral authority to amend a taking at any time. Based 
upon that interpretation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-34(2), the district court deemed the 
taking amended so as to remove appurtenant rights, eliminating Arby's claim for 
severance damages. Not only is this decision unsupported by the plain language of the 
statute (see infra Point 4), the decision is inconsistent with the court's determination that 
it was too late for UDOT to bring up new arguments. It is also inconsistent with this 
Court's mandate when the case was remanded to the district court following the prior 
appeal. See infra Point 3. The district court's decision appears to have been driven by its 
labeling it a motion in limine. 
5 
concern that if it ruled otherwise, it would be reversed on appeal. February Order, R. at p. 
470. 
In short, contrary to the impression UDOT attempts to convey, the district court's 
ultimate determination was not based upon an analysis of the prior deeds, but its 
interpretation of the statute UDOT raised at the last minute. The district court, in 
connection with the February Ruling reaffirming its prior decision that it was too late for 
UDOT to seek to amend its complaint, even described the application of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-34-11(2) as "the only issue remaining in this case." Id. at p. 469. Moreover, 
the written order dated March 20, 2008 expressly incorporates the district court's 
February Ruling, not the prior October Ruling. Order, R. at pp. 473-75. Despite this, 
UDOT spends pages in its Brief citing the October Ruling in an effort to direct the focus 
of this appeal to the prior deeds issue,4 which was not the basis of the district court's 
ruling. 
4
 UDOT makes legal arguments based upon the prior deeds in the section of its Brief 
entitled: "Statement of Facts." UDOT's Brief at pp. 5-7. Arby's should not be precluded 
from responding to these legal arguments asserted by UDOT in its Brief. See supra n. 3. 
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POINT 2 
UDOT'S ARGUMENTS BASED UPON PRIOR 
DEEDS SHOULD BE REJECTED 
The district court's holding was not based upon its interpretation of the prior 
deeds. However, even if the substance of UDOT's arguments about the prior deeds is 
considered the basis for the district court's ruling, the ruling should be reversed. 
UDOT argues the conveyances made by prior grantors severed all appurtenant 
rights from the small parcel of property Arby's eventually came to own. UDOT's Brief, 
p. 5. In other words, UDOT claims that decades before the elevated U.S. 89 was built, 
the parties intended, by virtue of warranty deeds that conveyed specifically identified real 
property in connection with constructing a public highway, to relinquish any and all 
appurtenant rights of air, light and view of the "remaining property." The pertinent 
language of the deeds is as follows: 
To enable the grantee to construct and maintain a public highway 
as an expressway ..., the grantors hereby release and relinquish to 
the grantee any and all rights or easements appurtenant to the 
grantors [sic] remaining property by reason of the location thereof 
with reference to said highway .... (Emphasis added). 
UDOT's Brief at p. 5; Exhibit "A" to UDOT's Memo, in Supp. of Mot. in Limine, R. at 
p. 328. 
7 
i 
A clear reading of the warranty deeds contradict UDOT's arguments. First, the 
deeds and related documents pertain to access and are even subtitled "controlled access." 
R. at pp. 328-343. 
Second, the documents specifically state that appurtenant rights and easements are 
released "to enable [UDOT] to construct and maintain a public highway as an expressway 
...." There is nothing about any elevated highway. The hallmark of an expressway or 
limited access facility is that it is "especially designed for through traffic." UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 72-1-102(11). In order for the highway to be "especially designed for though 
traffic," access to the highway has to have some limitations. However, the appurtenant 
right of view has nothing to do with whether the highway has "through traffic" or not. It 
is almost as if UDOT argues that if real estate is taken for a limited access facility, it 
automatically means that any and all appurtenant rights are relinquished, whether the 
owner realizes it or not. Such cannot be the case. The condemning authority should not 
be permitted to take more property than what is absolutely required. Pfeifer v. City of 
Little Rock, 57 S.W. 3d 714, 720 (Ark. 2001). 
Third, the plain language of the boilerplate provision in the subject warranty deeds 
provides that any release of appurtenant rights is based upon the "location"5 of the 
5
 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979) defines "location" as "the designation of the 
boundaries of a particular piece of land ...." This definition supports Arby's argument 
8 
highway in reference to the remaining property. In 1961, the location of the subject 
highway was at grade. There was no issue of loss of view with U.S. 89 at grade. There is 
no evidence to suggest that an elevated and expanded U.S. 89 was contemplated at the 
time the grantors executed the subject warranty deeds and right of way agreements. 
There is nothing in the documents themselves referencing plans that would be developed 
almost half a century later to engage in a completely new construction project to elevate 
the expressway, blocking the view of the property owners who would be forced to 
contribute part of their property so that U.S. 89 could be elevated. In other words, 
whatever rights were relinquished, they were relinquished under the facts and 
circumstances at the time. They were not released in reference to unknown construction 
projects that might arise in the distant future involving the raising of U.S. 89 over 
Shepard Lane. See Hartman v. Potter, 596 P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979) (A deed must be 
construed in light of its own language and peculiar facts). 
There are principles from cases decided in other jurisdictions that support Arby's 
position in this matter. First, it has been held it is not necessary to explicitly reserve in a 
deed an appurtenant easement. See Wenton v. Commonwealth, 138 N.E. 2d 609, 611 
(Mass. 1956). See also Webb v. Maine - New Hampshire Interstate Bridge Auth., 152 
that the subject warranty deeds had to do with the location on the ground, not an elevated 
expressway. 
9 
A.2d 521, 524 (N.H. 1959). Therefore, the fact there was no reservation of the 
appurtenant right of view does not mean the prior grantors intended to relinquish it 
through UDOT's boilerplate deed language. 
POINT 3 
THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT'S MANDATE UPON REMAND 
Whether UDOT had been conveyed appurtenant property rights at some point prior 
to filing this condemnation action is a basic, threshold question. If UDOT already owned 
these property rights, its argument should have been raised at the outset of this case. 
Presumably, when UDOT takes on the very serious work of condemning the 
constitutionally protected property rights of private owners, it engages in a careful and 
comprehensive investigation to determine the property rights it seeks to condemn. With 
respect to this case, UDOT's own Complaint and Condemnation Resolution clearly 
provide it was seeking to condemn all rights appurtenant to Arby's remaining property. 
Condemnation Resolution, R. at p. 7.6 It constitutes a troubling waste of resources that 
UDOT waited until after a lengthy appeals process and this Court's prior decision before 
abruptly changing course and arguing Arby's has never owned the very appurtenant rights 
6
 Plaintiffs are bound by what is alleged in Complaint. Powell v. Clay County Bd. of 
Supervisors, 924 So 2d 523, 527 (Miss. 2006). 
10 
that have been the subject of this protracted severance damages case. 
Both Arby's and this Court proceeded in the prior appeal based upon the way 
UDOT framed the issues through the contents of its Complaint and the Condemnation 
Resolution. There was never any indication during these prior proceedings UDOT would 
suddenly attempt to argue Arby's appurtenant property rights had already been conveyed 
to UDOT. UDOT never challenged Arby's ownership nor did anything to preserve that 
issue before the prior appeal. That Arby's owned the appurtenant property rights was 
subsumed by this Court when it decided the prior appeal. 
In light of the foregoing, this Court was very specific in its mandate to the district 
court upon remand. The court was to conduct further proceedings to determine whether 
the taking of Arby's property was "essential" to UDOT's project. Ivers v. Utah Dept. of 
Tramp., 154 P. 3d 802, 808 (Utah 2007). Because UDOT readily admitted the taking 
was essential, the district court should have simply proceeded with determining the 
amount of Arby's severance damages. However, rather than following this Court's 
mandate, the district court turned control of this case over to UDOT pursuant to UTAH 
The type of conduct engaged in by UDOT in this case typically constitutes a waiver. 
For example, in Sales v. Grant, 224 F.3d 293 (4th Cir.), the court held the defendants 
waived their right to assert an affirmative defense based upon qualified immunity because 
they had failed to press that claim until after the case had been remanded to the lower 
court following a prior appeal. Under the facts and circumstances of the present matter, 
UDOT has similarly waived any right to raise new arguments following remand. 
11 
CODE ANN. § 78-34-11(2), once again precluding Arby's from obtaining just 
compensation as required under the constitution. 
UDOT relies upon Madsen v. Washington Mut. Bank, 2008 WL 4299622 (Utah) 
for the proposition that it was proper for the district court to consider newly-raised 
arguments following remand. However, Madsen is distinguishable from the present 
matter. In that case, following remand, a federal preemption claim was considered. 
However, federal preemption was not a new issue. It had been preserved because it was 
raised before the appeal. Id. at f^ 16, n. 18. In the present matter, the parties and the 
various courts involved have always operated under the assumption Arby's had property 
rights upon which it could base a claim for severance damages. UDOT's pleadings even 
acknowledged this. Only after the Utah Supreme Court ruled in the prior appeal did 
UDOT choose to take a contrary position and make its never-before-made arguments. In 
short, UDOT never did anything in this case to preserve the arguments it asserted post-
remand.9 
8
 As this Court observed in Street v. Fourth Judicial Dist. Court, litigation would never 
come to an end if parties are permitted to amend and supplement pleadings following 
remand to "frame and try rights already settled." 191 P.2d 153, 158 (Utah 1948). 
9
 UDOT also cites Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986) for the 
proposition a complaint can be amended after remand. Call is distinguishable from the 
present matter because UDOT failed to raise the threshold issue of property ownership at 
the beginning of the case. This case then proceeded under the assumption Arby's owned 
appurtenant rights. The prior ruling of this Court was entered on that uncontested 
12 
The district court should be reversed for exceeding this Court's mandate upon 
remand. 
POINT 4 
THE DISTRICT COURT MISAPPLIED 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-11(2) 
Rather then responding to Arby's analysis regarding UTAH CODE ANN. §78-34-
11(2), UDOT's Brief contains an abbreviated argument that Arby's did not claim the 
statute is ambiguous and did not "suggest a correct interpretation." UDOT Br. at p. 12. 
UDOT is correct that the statute is not ambiguous. However, UDOT is incorrect that 
Arby's failed to explain how the district court erred in interpreting and applying the 
statute. Pages 15 through 20 of Arby's Brief set forth Arby's analysis. The simple fact is 
that the statute does not apply. UDOT did nothing to reduce the property actually taken 
from Arby's or to mitigate damages, both of which are required to be considered by the 
court or jury in assessing compensation. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-34(2). The statute 
does not say UDOT can amend its pleadings at any time to create a new basis to 
circumvent the constitution and refuse to pay severance damages. 
UDOT has chosen not to respond directly to Arby's arguments. For the reasons 
assumption. UDOT did nothing to reserve the issue of whether Arby's actually owned 
those appurtenant rights. Under the history of this case, it cannot be said that this issue 
was left open on remand. UDOT's practice of "shifting theories" should not be condoned 
13 
previously argued by Arby's, UDOT should not be allowed to manipulate UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-34-11(2) as a tool to avoid paying severance damages to property owners. 
However UDOT wants to construe the statute, it does not change the fact the subject 
construction project was built, and caused Arby's to suffer damages. 
POINT 5 
CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT A CHANGE 
IN THE DATE OF VALUATION 
Arby's acknowledges its argument concerning the date of valuation is being raised 
for the first time in this appeal. However, as the authorities UDOT relies upon point out, 
the general rule that arguments cannot be made for the first time on appeal is not absolute. 
There are "limited exceptions" to the rule. See Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. ofEduc, 797 
P. 2d 412, 413 (Utah 1990). 
Exceptional circumstances justify an appellate court considering an issue for the 
first time on appeal. Utah v. Sepulveda, 842 P. 2d 913, 917 (Utah 1992). Arby's submits 
there are exceptional circumstances involved in this case that warrant the Supreme 
Court's consideration of this matter. As the district court has pointed out, UDOT has 
engaged in a strategy of "shifting theories" in this case in reaction to rulings it doesn't 
like. February Ruling, R. at p. 469. The district court labeled UDOT's strategy as 
by this Court. 
14 
"inappropriate" and a waste of valuable resources. Id. UDOT's assertion of new 
arguments has led to this latest appeal. Arby's plea for the right to recover severance 
damages has already been in front of the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme 
Court before this present appeal. If the issue of timing of valuation is left to the district 
court upon remand, it only invites yet another appeal. That unnecessary, lengthy and 
expensive process can be avoided if this Court rules upon the valuation issue in the 
present appeal. Deciding the issue doesn't require any more information than the 
Supreme Court already has before it and the issue is closely related to what is already 
before the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing and the arguments made in Arby's opening Brief, the 
Supreme Court should reverse the ruling of the district court. 
Respectfully submitted this [^J day of October, 2008. 
WINDER & COUNSEL, P.C. 
DONALD J. WINDER 
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Attorneys for Appellants 
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